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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is a medical negligence case wherein Thomas R. Taylor ("Plaintiff') failed to serve 
the summons and complaint upon Eastern Idaho Health Services, Inc. d/b/a Eastern Idaho 
Regional Medical Center ("EIRMC") within six (6) months of filing his complaint. 
B. Course of Proceedings 
On January 20, 2011 Plaintiff filed a medical negligence action in Bonneville County, 
Idaho naming EIRMC as a defendant. R., pp. 7-17. On August 16,2011 EIRMC filed its 
Motion to Dismiss and supporting memorandum and affidavit. R., pp. 21-34. Plaintiff filed a 
motion and response to EIRMC's Motion to Dismiss on August 24,2011. R., pp. 36-48. 
EIRMC filed its reply in support of motion to dismiss and opposition to Plaintiff's motion on 
August 26,2011. R., pp. 75-91. The district court heard EIRMC's Motion to Dismiss on August 
30,2011 and briefly on September 27,2011 during Dr. Chamberlain's Motion to Dismiss 
hearing. Tr., pp. 6-68. The district court granted EIRMC's and Dr. Chamberlain's Motion to 
Dismiss and denied Plaintiff's Cross-Motion to Stay Case Nunc Pro Tunc or, alternatively to 
Enlarge Time to Serve Defendants in its September 29,2011 Opinion and Order on Plaintiff's 
Motion to Retain and Cross-Motion to Stay Case Nunc Pro Tunc or, alternatively, to Enlarge 
Time to Serve Defendants. R., pp. 134-143. 
On October 3, 2011 the district court entered a Judgment of Dismissal Without Prejudice 
dismissing EIRMC and Dr. Chamberlain without prejudice from the action. R., pp. 144-145. 
Plaintiff filed a Notice of Appeal on November 14,2011. R., pp. 146-150. The district court 
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filed an Amended Judgment on December 19, 2011 dismissing EIRMC, Dr. Chamberlain, Russ 
Rowberry, RNF A, Dr. Jacobs, Dr. Bhakta, Dr. Ontiveros, and IHC Health Services, Inc., d/b/a 
Cassia Regional Medical Center from the matter without prejudice. R., pp. 151-152. Plaintiff 
filed an Amended Notice of Appeal on January 30, 2012 and a Second Amended Notice of 
Appeal on February 23, 2012. R.,pp.155-159; 166-170. 
C. Statement of Facts 
On January 20,2011 Plaintiff filed a medical negligence action in Bonneville County, 
Idaho naming EIRMC as a defendant. R., pp. 7-17. On January 24,2011 Plaintiff filed a request 
for a prelitigation screening panel with the Idaho State Board of Medicine. Plaintiff made no 
attempt to serve EIRMC with a copy of the complaint and summons during the six month time 
period of January 20,2011 to July 20,2011. EIRMC's registered agent, CT Corporation System, 
was served with a copy of the Complaint and Summons in this matter on August 8, 2011. R., pp. 
20; 27. CT Corporation System is clearly identified as EIRMC's registered agent on the Idaho 
Secretary of State website and CT Corporation System has been EIRMC' s registered agent since 
December 17,2001. R., pp. 29-30. 
At the time Plaintiff filed his Complaint, this Court's decision of Rudd v. lvferritt, 138 
Idaho 526, 66 P.3d 230 (2003) was nearly eight (8) years old and was listed in the Notes of 
Decisions following both Idaho Code § § 6-1005 and 6-1006 in the Idaho Code Annotated (in 
both the West and Michie editions of the Idaho Code) and was listed in the Judicial Decisions 
section following Rule 4( a) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure in the West and Michie 
editions of the Idaho Court Rules. R., p. 76. Plaintiff did not move to enlarge the time in which 
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to serve defendants or seek a stay of this case until August 24, 2011, following the six month 
period of January 20, 11 July 20, 2011 and following the filing and service ofEIRMC's 
Motion to Dismiss and supporting documents on August 16,2011. R, pp. 36-38. 
II. ADDITIONAL ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Is EIRMC entitled to attorney's fees and costs on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-
121 and Rules 40 and 41 of the Idaho Appellate Rules? 
III. ARGUMENT 
This action is simply a matter of the Plaintiff failing to complete service of process on 
EIRM C within six months of filing his complaint. The district court's order and judgments 
granting EIRMC's Motion to Dismiss and dismissing EIRMC from this lawsuit should be 
affirmed pursuant to Elliot v. Verska, 152 Idaho 280, 271 P.3d 678 (2012), Rudd v. Merritt, 138 
Idaho 526, 66 P .3d 230 (2003), Rule 4( a)(2) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, and other 
pertinent Idaho case law precedent, statutes, and rules cited below in this brief. In his appeal, 
Plaintiff has not sought reversal of the district court's finding and conclusion that the actions of 
the Plaintiff in this matter did not meet the good cause standard mandated by Rule 4(a)(2) of the 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and he did not address the issue in his opening brief, thereby 
conceding that good cause was not shown in this matter. 
Plaintiff s entire appeal hinges on three arguments: 1) The district court should have 
applied LRC.P. 6(b)'s excusable neglect standard instead ofLRC.P. 4(a)(2)'s good cause 
standard; 2) Ignorance of the law and ignorance of procedural rules constitutes excusable 
neglect; or alternatively 3) A motion to stay nunc pro tunc is sufficient to avoid I.R.C.P. 4(a)(2)'s 
3 
time requirements for service of a summons and complaint and this Court's case law precedent 
set forth in Rudd v. Merritt, 138 Idaho 526,66 P.3d 230 (2003) (which was recently relied on in 
part in Elliot v. Verska, 152 Idaho 280, 271 P.3d 678 (2012») when such a motion is filed in a 
medical negligence action after the six month period oftime to serve process has expired; when 
no attempt of service was made upon a defendant during the six (6) month period oftime after 
the filing of a complaint; and after a defendant has made a motion to dismiss. 
As will be detailed below, the district court was correct in applying LR.C.P. 4(a)(2)'s 
good cause standard instead ofLR.C.P. 6(b)'s excusable neglect standard pursuant to Idaho case 
law precedent. In addition, even if an excusable neglect standard is examined this Court has 
repeatedly and consistently held that ignorance of the law and ignorance of procedural rules do 
not constitute excusable neglect. Further, the district court was correct in denying Plaintiffs 
motion for a stay nunc pro tunc, which was only filed after Plaintiff had failed to timely serve 
EIRMC, after Plaintiff had failed to make any attempt of service ofEIRMC during the six (6) 
month period of time following the filing of his complaint, and after EIRMC had filed its motion 
to dismiss. 
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A. THE DISTRICT COURT WAS CORRECT IN APPLYING AND 
GRANTING EIRMC'S MOTION TO DISMISS PURUSANT TO I.R.c.P. 
4(a)(2)'S "GOOD CAUSE" STANDARD BECAUSE THIS COURT HAS 
HELD THAT "GOOD CAUSE" IS THE APPLICABLE STANDARD 
WITH REGARD TO COMPLIANCE WITH I.R.C.P. 4(a)(2)'s 
REQUIREMENTS AND I.R.C.P. 4(a)(2) IS THE SPECIFIC RULE 
GOVERNING THE SERVICE OF A COMPLAINT AND SUMMONS. 
1. I.R.C.P. 4(a)(2)'s good cause standard is the applicable standard to be 
employed in a case where a party has failed to serve process within the six 
(6) month time requirement imposed by said rule and reliance upon an 
excusable neglect standard is contrary to Idaho case law. 
This Court discussed the applicable standard to be utilized where a party fails to comply 
with LR.C.P. 4(a)(2)'s mandatory time requirements in Sammis v. Magnetek, Inc., 130 Idaho 
342,941 P.2d 314 (1997). This Court held: 
In their briefing before this Court, the [Plaintiffs] argue that we should consider 
"good cause" in Rule 4(a)(2) as synonymous with "excusable neglect." Even if 
this were the applicable standard, we have held that ignorance of procedural 
requirements goes beyond excusable neglect: "[A pro se litigant's fJailure to be 
aware of the requirements of procedural rules does not constitute excusable 
neglect." Golay, 118 Idaho at 392,797 P.2d at 100 (quoting lower court when 
discussing excusable neglect for purposes of LR.C.P. 60(b)(1). Thus, even under 
this more relaxed standard, the [Plaintiffs'] pro se status does not excuse their 
failure to comply with the time limitations in Rule 4(a)(2). 
Sammis v. Magnetek, Inc., 130 Idaho 342, 347, 941 P.2d 314,319 (1997) (emphasis added). 
As this COUli recognized in Sammis, in cases where a plaintiff has failed to timely serve a 
party with a copy of the summons and complaint the applicable standard to be utilized is LR.C.P. 
4(a)(2)'s good cause standard and not an excusable neglect standard. Therefore, Plaintiff's 
contention that an excusable neglect standard should have been applied by the district court in 
this matter is without merit and contrary to this Court's statement in Sammis. 
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Plaintiff has conceded that he did not meet the good cause standard set forth in LR.C.P. 
4(a)(2) by failing to address or seek reversal of the district court's finding and conclusion that 
Plaintiff's actions in this matter did not meet the good cause standard ofI.R.C.P. 4(a)(2). Rowley 
v. Fuhrman, 133 Idaho 105, 982 P.2d 940 (1999) ("The Fuhrmans did not list the threshold issue 
of waiver with respect to their statute of frauds defense as an issue on appeal pursuant to Idaho 
Appellate Rule 35(a)(4) or otherwise address the issue in their opening brief. The failure to 
include the waiver issue in their statement of issues or address the issue in their opening brief 
eliminates consideration of it on appeal." !d. at 106,982 P.2d at 943 (citations omitted». 
Accordingly, the district court's judgments dismissing EIRMC from this lawsuit should be 
affinned. 
2. With respect to the time limitations and requirements a plaintiff must 
comply with in order to serve a party with a copy of the summons and 
complaint and the burden that must be met when such time limitations are 
not satisfied, Rule 4(a)(2) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure is a more 
specific rule than Rule 6(b) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and 
therefore the district court was correct in applying LR.C.P. 4(a)(2) in this 
matter. 
"A specific statute, and by analogy a specific rule of civil or criminal procedure, controls 
over a more general statute when there is any conflict between the two or when the general 
statute is vague or ambiguous." Ausman v. State, 124 Idaho 839, 842, 864 P.2d 1126, 1129 
(1993). 
'Where two statutes appear to apply to the same case or subject matter, the 
specific statute will control over the more general statute.' Gooding County v. 
Wybenga, 137 Idaho 201, 204, 46 P .3d 18, 21 (2002). Idaho Code § 6-803 is a 
general statute, while Idaho Code § 6-903(a) is a specific statute limiting the 
liability of governmental entities. 
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Athay v. Stacey, 146 Idaho 407, 419,196 P.3d 325, 337 (2008). 
Rule 4(a)(2) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure states: 
If a service of the summons and complaint is not made upon a defendant within 
six (6) months after the filing of the complaint and the party on whose behalf such 
service was required cannot show good cause why such service was not made 
within that period, the action shall be dismissed as to that defendant without 
prejudice upon the court's own initiative with 14 days notice to such party or 
upon motion. 
Rule 6(b) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure states: 
When by these rules or by a notice given thereunder or by order of court an act is 
required or allowed to be done at or within a specified time, the parties, by written 
stipulation, which does not disturb the orderly dispatch of business or the 
convenience of the court, filed in the action, before or after the expiration of the 
specified period, may enlarge the period, or the court for cause shown may at any 
time in its discretion (1) with or without motion or notice order the period 
enlarged if request therefor is made before the expiration of the period originally 
prescribed or as extended by previous order or (2) upon motion made after the 
expiration of the specified period permit the act to be done where the failure to act 
was the result of excusable neglect; but the time may not be extended for taking 
any action under rules 50(b), 52(b), 59(b), (d), (e), and 60(b) except to the extent 
and under the conditions stated in them. 
Based upon a plain reading of Rules 4(a)(2) and 6(b) ofthe Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure there can be no question that when it comes to the time requirements of serving a 
summons and complaint and the burden which must be met when the time requirements of 
serving a summons and complaint are not satisfied LR.C.P. 4(a)(2) is the more specific rule. 
LR.C.P. 4(a)(2) specifically states that a summons and complaint must be served within six (6) 
months of filing a complaint and that the action shall be dismissed if the paliy cannot show good 
cause why service was not made within the required time period. LR.C.P. 6(b) is a general rule 
7 
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which does not specifically address the service of a summons and complaint. This matter is 
analogous to this Court's reasoning in Athay cited above; LR.C.P. 6(b) is a general rule while 
LR.C.P. 4(a)(2) is a specific rule mandating that the good cause burden must be shown and met 
if a party fails to timely serve a copy of the summons and complaint. 
Notably, Plaintiff does not cite to and EIRMC cannot find one (1) Idaho appellate case 
wherein either this Court or the Idaho Court of Appeals has applied an excusable neglect 
standard instead ofthe good cause standard imposed by LR.C.P. 4(a)(2) when a party has failed 
to serve a summons and complaint within the six (6) month period of time mandated by LR.C.P. 
4(a)(2). See Elliot v. Verska, 152 Idaho 280,271 P.3d 678 (2012); Herrera v. Estay, 146 Idaho 
674,201 P.3d 647 (2009); Harrison v. Board o.fPro/essional Discipline o/the Idaho State Board 
o/Medicine, 145 Idaho 179, 177 P.3d 393 (2008); Campbell v. Reagan, 144 Idaho 254,159 P.3d 
891 (2007); Ruddv. Merritt, 138 Idaho 526, 66 P.3d 230 (2003); Martin v. Hoblit, 133 Idaho 
372,987 P.2d 284 (1999); Sammis v. Magnetek, Inc., 130 Idaho 342, 941 P.2d 314 (1997). In 
fact, as cited above, this Court stated in Sammis that good cause not excusable neglect was the 
applicable standard to utilize in situations where a party has failed to timely serve a copy of 
his/her summons and complaint. Sammis, 130 Idaho at 347,941 P.2d at 319 (1997). 
Additionally, if a party failed to timely serve hislher summons and complaint and was 
then allowed to utilize an excusable neglect standard it would eviscerate and render meaningless 
the good cause standard and burden mandated by I.R.C.P. 4(a)(2). Under Plaintiffs reading of 
I.R.C.P. 4(a)(2) and 6(b) a party would never be required to show good cause why service was 
not timely made as long as he/she allowed the six (6) month period for service to expire and then 
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were able to show excusable neglect as to why service was not made. Such a reading would be 
illogical and contrary to Idaho law. 
Further, Plaintiff's contention in his opening brief on page 13 that LR.C.P. 4(a)(2) "is 
nothing more than a nonmandatory, nonjurisdictional, procedural rule" is false. This Court held 
in Sammis that "Rule 4(a)(2) is couched in mandatory language, requiring dismissal where a 
party does not comply, absent a showing of good cause." Sammis, 130 Idaho at 347,941 P.2d at 
319 (emphasis added). This Court has also noted that "[ s ]ervice of process is the due process 
procedure that vests a court with jurisdiction over a person, with the power to require such 
person to comply with the court's orders." MeGloon v. Gwynn, 140 Idaho 727, 730, 100 P.3d 
621,624 (2004). 
Based upon the foregoing, if a conflict can even be read between I.R.C.P. 4(a)(2) and 
l.R.C.P. 6(b) there is no question that LR.C.P. 4(a)(2) is the more specific rule with respect to the 
time limitation in which a party is required to serve a summons and complaint and the burden 
that must be met to overcome the failure to comply with such time limitations. Consequently, 
the district court was correct in applying LR.C.P. 4(a)(2)'s good cause standard in this matter, 
granting EIRMC's Motion to Dismiss, and dismissing EIRMC without prejudice. Therefore, 
EIRMC respectfully requests that the district court's order and judgments be affirmed. 
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B. EVEN IF EXCUSABLE NEGLECT IS EXAMINED IN THIS MATTER, 
WHICH IT SHOULD NOT, THIS COURT HAS REPEATEDLY AND 
CONSISTENTL Y HELD THAT IGNORANCE OF THE LAW AND 
IGNORANCE OF PROCEDURAL RULES DOES NOT CONSTITUE 
EXCUSABLE NEGLECT. 
As set forth above, the COlTect standard to be applied in this case is I.R.C.P. 4(a)(2)'s 
good cause standard, which the district court cOlTectly applied. However, if this COUli decides to 
undertake an excusable neglect analysis such a journey provides Plaintiff with no respite. 
Distilled to its essence, Plaintiffs claim of excusable neglect is that he was ignorant of the law 
and ignorant of procedural requirements ("That he was unaware of the outlier Rudd case should 
not be held against him"). R., p. 43. Rudd is not and has never been an outlier case. Rudd was 
issued in 2003 and has never been overturned, and in fact was recently relied upon in the Elliot 
case issued in January of this year. In addition, as pointed out in the statement of facts, Rudd is 
listed in the Notes of Decisions following both I.C. § 6-1005 and I.C. § 6-1006 in the Idaho Code 
Aru10tated in both the West and Michie versions ofthe Idaho Code and is listed in the Judicial 
Decisions section following Rule 4(a) in the Michie and West editions ofthe Idaho Court Rules. 
It is not as if the Rudd decision was hidden or issued decades ago. 
Plaintiff relies primarily upon an Idaho Court of Appeals case from 1987, Schraufnagel v. 
Quinowski, 113 Idaho 753, 747 P.2d 775 (Ct. App. 1987), to support his contention that 
ignorance of the law and of procedural requirements constitutes excusable neglect. However, 
this Court and the Idaho Court of Appeals have repeatedly and consistently issued decisions 
post-1987 rejecting such an argument, with this Court holding in 1997: "ignorance of procedural 
requirements goes beyond excusable neglect". Sammis, 130 Idaho at 347,941 P.2d at 319. 
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The facts, circumstances, and reasoning applied in the Idaho Court of Appeals case of 
Washington Federal Savings and Loan Ass'nv. Transamerica Premier Ins. Co., 124 Idaho 913, 
865 P.2d 1004 (Ct. App. 1993) is particularly instructive in the instant matter. In Washington 
Federal, a senior claims manager and assistant vice president for an insurance company untimely 
responded to a complaint and a default judgment was entered. !d. at 915,865 P.2d at 1006. The 
district court granted a motion to set aside the default judgment, however, the Idaho Court of 
Appeals reversed. The insurance company, just like the Plaintiff in this case, attempted to rely 
upon Schraufnagel, which dealt with a pro se litigant failing to attend a hearing on a motion for 
summary judgment. The Idaho Court of Appeals reasoned: 
The record suggests two possibilities: either Mr. Forbes did not read the Idaho 
statute or he misinterpreted it. Either scenario presents a mistake of law. The 
traditional rule, expressed by our Supreme Court, is that a "mistake sufficient to 
warrant setting aside a default judgment must be of fact and not of law." Hearst 
Corporation v. Keller, 100 Idaho 10, 11, 592 P.2d 66, 67 (1979) reversed on other 
grounds, Shelton v. Diamond International Corp., 108 Idaho at 938,703 P.2d at 
702. We observe that ignorance of the law or rules of procedure are generally 
inexcusable. See 11 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 2858 P. 170 (1973) .... 
We find Schrauji1agel to be inapposite. "The courts must weigh each case in 
light of its unique facts." Johnson, 104 Idaho at 732, 662 P.2d at 1176. Here, Mr. 
Forbes is not a pro se litigant and there was no confusion over conflicting 
documents, statutes or rules. There was only a misinterpretation of or an 
ignorance of Idaho law. 
ld. at 917-18, 865 P.2d at 1008-09. 
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In this case, Plaintiff and his counsel either did not read LR.C.P. 4(a)(2) and/or Rudd v. 
Merritt, 138 Idaho 526, 66 P.3d 230 (2003) or they misinterpreted the rule and case. In this case, 
Plaintiff was not a pro se litigant just as Mr. Forbes in Washington Federal was not a pro se 
litigant. At the time in question in this case Plaintiff was represented by two (2) law firms and at 
least three (3) attorneys. In this case, just as in Washington Federal, there was no confusion over 
statutes and rules. LR.C.P. 4(a)(2) is a clear and unambiguous rule. The Rudd decision clearly 
interprets the applicability of LR.C.P. 4(a)(2) to medical malpractice actions filed before or 
contemporaneously with a request for prelitigation proceedings. In this case, just as in 
Washington Mutual, there was only a misinterpretation of or an ignorance of Idaho law. 
Therefore, just as excusable neglect did not exist in the Washington Federal case, excusable 
neglect does not exist in this case. 
This Court also held in Golay v. Loomis, 118 Idaho 387, 797 P.2d 95 (1990): 
Next we consider whether the magistrate erred by refusing to grant Loomis' 
motion for relief from the summary judgment pursuant to LR.C.P. 60(b). Loomis 
alleges that any failure on his part to properly oppose the motion for summary 
judgment was excusable neglect or the result of a mistake. . .. 
We note initially that while Loomis appeared at the summary judgment hearing 
pro se, he may not request special consideration on that basis. "Pro se litigants 
are held to the same standards and rules as those represented by an attorney." 
(citations omitted). We agree with the district court's analysis of this issue as set 
forth in its decision denying Loomis' petition for rehearing. 
The facts of the present case do not demonstrate excusable neglect as 
contemplated by I.R.C.P. 60(b)(l). The present case presents a situation more 
similar to that found in Golden Condor. ... Golden Condor dealt with a pro 
se litigant's failure to preserve an issue for appeal which precluded 
consideration of the issue on appeal. The Idaho Supreme Court noted: 
12 
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In all likelihood this result [failure to preserve issue for appeal] has come 
about due to appellant's lack of understanding of the procedural rules of 
law. Nevertheless, the failure to abide by such rules may not "be excused 
simply because [appellant was] appearing pro se and may not have been 
aware of the rule[s]." Scafco Boise, Inc. v. Rigby, 98 Idaho 432, 434, 566 
P .2d 381, 383 (1977). Pro se litigants are held to the same standards and 
rules as those represented by an attorney. (citation omitted). 
Golden Condor, Inc. v. Bell, [112 Idaho at 1089, n. 5, 739 P.2d at 388, n. 5] 
(1987). 
The summary judgment entered against appellant in the present case was the 
result of his not being aware of the rules requiring verification of pleadings. 
Failure to be aware of the requirements of procedural rules does not 
constitute excusable neglect. Summary judgment having been properly 
entered and appellant having failed to show excusable neglect, the trial court 
properly denied appellant's motion to set aside the judgment under Rule 60(b). 
Had the trial court affirmatively misled appellant as to the adequacy of his 
unverified answer prior to the hearing on the summary judgment motion, a 
different case would be presented. However, as stated, appellant's failings, as 
argued at summary judgment and on the motion to set aside, were the result of 
appellant's lack of understanding of the procedural rules of law and, as 
such, do not constitute excusable neglect. 
We conclude that the district court's analysis of this case under I.R.C.P. 
60(b) was not erroneous. The district court correctly stated and applied the 
standard for determining whether an 1.R.c.P. 60(b) motion should have been 
granted by the magistrate court on the ground of alleged mistake or 
excusable neglect. 
Accordingly, we reject Loomis's argument that his failure to abide by the 
summary judgment procedural rules may "be excused simply because 
[appellant was J appearing pro se and may not have been aware of the 
rule[s]." Scafco Boise, Inc. v. Rigby, 98 Idaho 432,434, 566 P.2d 381,383 
(1977). 
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Golay v. Loomis, 118 Idaho 387, 391-93, 797 P.2d 95, 99-101 (1990) (emphasis added). 
As set forth above, this Court's decisions of Sammis v. Magnetek, Inc., 130 Idaho 342, 
941 P.2d 314 (1997); Golay v. LOOlnis, 118 Idaho 387, 797 P.2d 95 (1990); Golden Condor, Inc. 
v. Bell, 112 Idaho 1086, 739 P.2d 385 (1987); and the Idaho Court of Appeals decision of 
Washington Federal Savings and Loan Ass 'n v. Transamerica Premier Ins. Co., 124 Idaho 913, 
865 P.2d 1004 (Ct. App. 1993) have all clearly held that not even a pro se litigant's failure to be 
aware of the requirements of procedural rules constitutes excusable neglect. If a pro se litigant's 
failure to be aware of procedural rules does not constitute excusable neglect then there can be no 
question that the Plaintiff in this matter (represented by two (2) law firms and at least tlu'ee (3) 
attomeys) has not shown excusable neglect by their failure to be aware ofLR.C.P. 4(a)(2)'s time 
requirements and this Court's decision in Rudd, which delineates the applicability ofLR.C.P. 
4(a)(2) when a medical malpractice action has been filed prior to or contemporaneously with a 
request for prelitigation proceedings. 
Thus, even using an excusable neglect standard in this matter (which should not be used) 
Plaintiff's ignorance of the law and ignorance of procedural requirements does not meet such a 
standard. Accordingly, EIRMC would respectfully request that this Court affirm the order and 
judgments of the district court granting EIRMC's Motion to Dimsiss and dismissing EIRMC 
from the action . 
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C. PLAINTIFF FAILED TO TIMELY SERVE EIRMC IN THIS ACTION 
PURSUANT TO THIS COURT'S CASE LAW PRECEDENT FOUND IN 
ELLIOT V. VERSKA, 152 IDAHO 280, 271 P.3D 678 (2012) AND RUDD V. 
MERRITT, 138 IDAHO 526, 66 P.3D 230 (2003); THEREFORE THE 
DISTRICT COURT'S ORDER AND JUDGMENTS DISMISSING EIRMC 
SHOULD BE AFFIRMED. 
The issue presented to this Court by Plaintiff (failing to serve a copy of the complaint and 
summons upon the defendants within six (6) months of filing a medical negligence action) is not 
new. In fact, this Court already examined and ruled on the issue of service in Rudd v. Merritt, 
138 Idaho 526, 66 P.3d 230 (2003) and recently affirmed the Rudd decision in Elliot v. Verska, 
152 Idaho 280, 271 P.3d 678 (2012). 
In Rudd, the plaintiffs filed a medical negligence action in district court and filed a 
request for a pre-litigation screening panel on the same day. The plaintiffs in Rudd failed to 
serve the summons and complaint upon any defendant before the expiration of the six month 
period required by Rule 4(a)(2) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. at 533,66 P.3d at 236. 
Addressing the issue of a plaintiff filing a lawsuit before the completion of proceedings before a 
prelitigation screening panel this Court held: 
The Plaintiffs chose to file this lawsuit before the completion of the proceedings 
before the prelitigation screening panel. Having done so, they were required by 
Rule 4(a)(2) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure to serve the summons and 
complaint upon the Defendants \vithin six months. This Court first applied Rule 
4(a)(2) in the Sammis v. Magnetek case. As stated by the district court in both of 
its order, "[I]t has been abundantly clear for quite awhile [sic] that the Rule will 
be applied strictly." 
Rudd, 138 Idaho at 533, 66 P.3d at 237. 
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In Elliot, this Court cited to Rudd for the proposition that a plaintiff in a medical 
negligence case must serve the summons and complaint upon the defendants within six (6) 
months of filing a complaint as required by Rule 4(a)(2) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Elliot, 152 Idaho at _,271 P.3d at 687. This Court also examined the good cause analysis 
under Rule 4(a)(2) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and held that pending proceedings 
before the prelitigation screening panel "are irrelevant to good cause." ld. This Court also noted 
that "[ w]e have never held that service of process cannot be accomplished while a matter is 
pending before the prelitigation screening panel." !d. 
Just as the plaintiffs in Rudd chose to file their lawsuit before the completion of the 
prelitigation screening panel proceedings, the Plaintiff in this matter chose to file his lawsuit 
before completion of the proceedings before the prelitigation screening panel. Having done so, 
Plaintiff was required by Rule 4( a)(2) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Rudd, and now 
Elliot to serve EIRMC within six (6) months of filing his complaint. As this Court noted in 
Elliot, it has never held that service of process carmot be accomplished while a matter is pending 
before the prelitigation screening panel. Plaintiff failed to make any attempt of service upon 
EIRMC in the six (6) months following the filing of his complaint. Subsequently, Plaintiff 
attempted untimely service upon EIRMC. Accordingly, the district court's order granting 
EIRMC's Motion to Dismiss and judgments dismissing EIRMC from this action should be 
affinned. 
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D. THE DISTRICT COURT WAS CORRECT TO DENY PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FORA STAY WHERE SUCH STAY WAS NOT REQUESTED 
UNTIL AFTER THE TIME HAD EXPIRED FOR SERVING EIRMC 
WITH PROCESS IN THIS MATTER AND ONLY REQUESTED AFTER 
EIRMC HAD FILED ITS MOTION TO DISMISS. 
Plaintiffs entire stay argument is moot and illusory. The record in this case is undisputed 
that Plaintiff did not request a stay in this matter until more than seven (7) months had elapsed 
from the time of the filing of his complaint. By the time Plaintiff requested a stay the six (6) 
month period in which to serve EIRMC with process had expired, EIRMC had filed a motion to 
dismiss, and this Court's decision in Rudd had been brought to Plaintiff s attention. Plaintiff in 
this case is in the very same position the plaintiffs in Rudd found themselves, which is they did 
not timely seek a stay (the Rudd plaintiffs never sought a stay while the plaintiff in this case only 
sought a stay after his service time had expired and Rudd was brought to his attention). 
Entering a stay nunc pro tunc in this matter would render LR.C.P. 4(a)(2), Rudd, and 
Elliot null and void and reward Plaintiffs ignorance of the law and failure to follow and take 
advantage of the tolling of the statute oflimitations as found in Idaho Code § 6-1005. In sum, 
Plaintiff cannot be allowed to file this litigation and then attempt to seek some sort of protection 
from a statute (and a process) that he ignored and circumvented in the first place. 
1. Granting a stay nunc pro tunc in this matter would render LR.C.P. 4(a)(2), 
Rudd, and Elliot null and void and reward Plaintiff s ignorance of the law. 
Idaho Code § 6-1005 states in pertinent part: 
... the applicable statute of limitations shall be tolled and not deemed to run 
during the time that such a claim is pending before such a panel ... 
Plaintiff could have filed a request for a prelitigation screening panel, which would have 
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tolled the statute of limitations on his claim and then filed his claim following the conclusion of 
the prelitigation screening panel proceedings. However, Plaintiff chose to ignore and circumvent 
the tolling provisions of I.C. § 6-1005 and filed this lawsuit before the completion of the 
proceedings before the prelitigation screening panel. "Having done so, they were required by 
Rule 4(a)(2) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure to serve the summons and complaint upon the 
Defendants within six months." Rudd, 138 Idaho at 533, 66 P.3d at 237. 
If the Plaintiff in this matter were granted a stay nunc pro tunc the precedent that would 
be set would be that a plaintiff could file a medical negligence action in court prior to the 
completion of the prelitigation screening panel process, wait an indeterminate amount of time 
from the time the complaint was filed to serve the summons and complaint, serve the summons 
and complaint upon a defendant even a year after filing the complaint, and then seek a stay nunc 
pro tunc to avoid the mandates of I.R.C.P. 4(a)(2). In such a world there would be no celiainty 
for courts or defendants. Medical negligence actions could be filed and then just sit 
indetenninately clogging court dockets and giving medical providers no certainty as to the status 
of cases until a plaintiff would one day serve the lawsuit knowing that if the matter was served 
untimely all he or she would have to do would be to request a stay nunc pro tunc to avoid any 
time requirements for service. 
Granting a stay nunc pro tunc would effectively render Rule 4(a)(2) of the Idaho Rules of 
Civil Procedure meaningless in a medical negligence case and would overturn this Court's 
decisions of Elliot v. Verska, 152 Idaho 280, 271 PJd 678 (2012) and Ruddv. Merritt, 138 Idaho 
526, 66 P.3d 230 (2003). In addition, granting such a stay would reward Plaintiff for not taking 
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advantage of the tolling provision ofLC. § 6-1005 and also reward Plaintiffs ignorance of the 
Rudd decision. Accordingly, EIRMC would respectfully request that this Court affirm the 
district court's denial of Plaintiff s request for a stay nunc pro tunc in this matter. 
2. A stay pursuant to Idaho Code § 6-1006 in this matter is irrelevant because 
Plaintiff already commenced the litigation by filing his complaint and 
nothing prohibited Plaintiff from serving EIRMC during the pendency of 
the prelitigation panel proceedings in this matter. 
A stay pursuant to Idaho Code § 6-1006 is irrelevant to the present matter because 
Plaintiff did not request a stay until faced with a motion to dismiss over seven (7) months after 
he filed his complaint. At the time EIRMC filed its Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff and the 
plaintiffs in Rudd were in the same exact position. In neither case was a stay requested. In 
addition, there is no dispute that Plaintiff did not request a stay in the court proceedings in the six 
months following the filing of his complaint. This Court recently stated that "[w]e have never 
held that service of process cannot be accomplished while a matter is pending before the 
prelitigation screening panel." Elliot, 152 Idaho at _,271 P.3d at 687. Consequently, there is 
no valid reason why Plaintiff did not serve EIRMC with a copy of the summons and complaint in 
this matter in the six (6) months following the filing of his complaint because it is undisputed 
there was no stay in place, no stay had been requested, and no decision from this Court stating 
that service could not be accomplished during the pendency of the prelitigation screening panel. 
Therefore, Plaintiffs contention that a stay should toll LR.C.P. 4(a)(2)'s service deadline is 
in'elevant, illusory, and has no bearing in this matter because no stay was ever requested or 
entered during the applicable time period following the filing of the complaint. 
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Even though this Court need not determine the issue of whether a stay issued pursuant to 
Idaho Code § 6-1006 would justify failing to serve the summons and complaint while that stay 
was in effect if the Court is so inclined to rule on said issue, EIRMC would request that this 
Court rule any such stay would not justify failing to serve the summons and complaint while that 
stay was in effect. This Court held in Moss v. Bjornson, 115 Idaho 165, 167, 765 P.2d 676,678 
(1988): 
Thus, under I.e. § 6-1006, the district court is vested with authority to stay civil 
proceedings until the prelitigation screening panel renders its advisory opinion. 
As a result, while filing with the screening panel is a condition precedent to 
proceeding with district court litigation, such as filing interrogatories or setting 
trial dates, it is not a condition precedent to filing an action in order to toll the 
statute of limitations. 
The purpose of a stay as implied in Moss is to prevent discovery from proceeding in a 
case and otherwise stop the progression of a filed case to trial during the prelitigation screening 
process. A case can only progress towards trial if the plaintiff has served the defendant with the 
lawsuit. A stay should not become a means to lengthen the time in which a complaint and 
summons can be served upon a defendant; the legislature has already provided a mechanism for 
claimants by way ofl.C. § 6-1005 to toll the statute of limitations on medical negligence actions 
so that a claimant does not even have to file an action (let alone serve a lawsuit) until the 
prelitigation screening panel proceedings have concluded. 
If a claimant/plaintiff chooses to ignore the provisions of I.C. § 6-1005 and file an action 
in cOUli contemporaneously with or while the prelitigation screening panel process is pending 
he/she should be required to comply with Rule 4(a)(2) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and 
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serve the matter within six (6) months of filing a complaint. See Elliot v. Verska, 152 Idaho 280, 
271 P.3d 678 (2012); Rudd v. Merritt, 138 Idaho 526, 66 P.3d 230 (2003). This Court has "never 
held that service of process cannot be accomplished while a matter is pending before the 
prelitigation screening panel." Elliot v. Verska, 152 Idaho 280, _, 271 P.3d 678,687 (2012). 
Therefore, EIRMC would respectfully request that this Court rule that a stay issued pursuant to 
I.C. § 6-1006 does not stay the time in which to serve the summons and complaint while such 
stay is in effect. Accordingly, EIRMC requests that this Court affirm the district court's decision 
granting EIRMC's Motion to Dismiss, denying Plaintiff's Cross-Motion to Stay Case Nunc Pro 
Tunc or Motion to Enlarge Time to Serve Defendants, and uphold the judgments dismissing 
EIRMC in this matter. 
E. EIRMC IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS ON 
APPEAL PURSUANT TO IDAHO CODE § 12-121 AND RULES 40 AND 41 
OF THE IDAHO APPELLATE RULES; PLAINTIFF IS NOT ENTITLED 
TO ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS ON APPEAL. 
This Court has held that a party is "entitled to attorney fees on appeal pursuant to I.e. § 
12-121 if this Court is left with the abiding belief that the appeal was brought or pursued 
frivolously, unreasonably, and without foundation." Rowley v. Fuhrman, 133 Idaho 105, 109-
110,982 P.2d 940, 944 (1999). In this case, Plaintiff has conceded that he did not meet the good 
cause standard mandated by LR.C.P. 4(a)(2). Plaintiff has argued that the district court should 
have applied an excusable neglect standard instead of a good cause standard even though this 
Court stated in Sammis v. Magnetek, Inc., 130 Idaho 342, 347, 941 P.2d 314, 319 (1997) that 
good cause, not excusable neglect, is the standard to be applied in cases where a summons and 
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complaint have been untimely served. Plaintiff failed to cite to one (1) Idaho appellate case 
where an excusable neglect standard was utilized instead of a good cause standard where the 
issue of untimely service was involved. Plaintiff has also argued that his ignorance of procedural 
requirements and ignorance of the law constitutes excusable neglect even though this Court and 
the Court of Appeals have repeatedly held that ignorance of the law and ignorance of procedural 
requirements do not constitute excusable neglect. 
In addition, Plaintiff has argued that he should have been granted a stay nunc pro tunc 
even though he, like the plaintiffs in Rudd, did not request a stay during the six (6) months 
following the filing of his complaint and did not request such a stay until after EIRMC had filed 
its Motion to Dismiss. In sum, Plaintiff's appeal was brought and pursued frivolously, 
umeasonably, and without foundation. Consequently, EIRMC is entitled to its attorney's fees 
and costs on appeal. 
Plaintiff has sought attorney's fees and costs in his opening appellate brief. However, 
Plaintiff has not enunciated how EIRMC defended this matter frivolously, umeasonably, and 
without foundation. In fact, EIRMC defended this case and the present appeal on the basis of 
this Court's case law precedent set forth in Elliot v. Verska, 152 Idaho 280, 271 P.3d 678 (2012), 
Ruddv. Merritt, 138 Idaho 526, 66 P.3d 230 (2003), Rule 4(a)(2) of the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure, and this Court's and the Idaho Court of Appeals' case law discussing and interpreting 
good cause and excusable neglect. Accordingly, Plaintiff's request for attorney's fees and costs 
should be denied. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff chose to file an action in court prior to filing a request for prelitigation screening 
panel proceedings even though he was not required to do so pursuant to Idaho Code § 6-1005. 
Having chosen to file his complaint in court and disregard the protections of I.C. § 6-1005 
Plaintiff was required to serve EIRMC with a copy of the summons and complaint within six (6) 
months of filing said complaint. Plaintiff failed to timely serve EIRMC and admitted to being 
ignorant and unaware 0 f the Rudd decision. Plaintiff s disregard and ignorance of Idaho law and 
Idaho procedural requirements should not be rewarded on appeal. 
'I I 
Accordingly, EIRMC respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's order 
granting EIRMC's Motion to Dismiss and denying Plaintiffs Motion to Stay Case Nunc Pro 
Tunc or, Alternatively, to Enlarge Time to Serve Defendants and uphold the district court's 
judgments dismissing EIRMC from this matter. In addition, EIRMC requests that this Court 
award it attorney's fees and costs on appeal. 
I , B I DATED this~day of August, 2012. 
SMITH & BANKS, PLLC 
r;i:MARVIN M. SMITH 
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